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D

THE SUPREHE COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

Paul M. Gardner
Plaintiff and Appellant,
VS.

NO. 16615

Shannadean Dipo Christensen
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLAlTT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE HATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for recovery of damages arising out
of

~efendant's

breach of an Option agreement for real property.

::JISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was filed by Plaintiff on December 15, 1977
to recover damages from Defendant for the breach of an Option
agreement or in the alternative to compel Defendant to perform
and convey title to the subject real property under the terms
of

an Ootion agreement entered into between one, Michael Heyrend,

and the 'Jefendant on

~lay

18, 1977 which Option was subsequently

assigned to Plaintiff and duly exercised by him on October 18,
1977.

On February 2, 1978 Plaintiff made a motion

for permis-

sion to amend Plaintiff's complaint to delete its alternative
claim for specific performance and for partial summary judgment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-2on the issue of liability.

On March 16, 1978 the Honorable

David K. Winder, Third District Court Judge, granted Plaintif:
motion to amend Plaintiff's complaint and for partial sUlllI!lar.·
judgment that Defendant had in fact breached the Option agree.
ment and was liable to Plaintiff for all damages suffered by
Plaintiff arising out of said breach.

On March 27, 1979, t~

damage issue was tried to the Court, the Honorable Earnest L.
Baldwin. Third District Court Judge presiding, and judgment
was granted for the Plaintiff in the amount of $2,000.00, the
amount which had been paid as consideration for the Option anc'
which was to apply as a credit against the purchase price of
the real property, and for interest at six percent and costs
incurred by Plaintiff, but excluding all special damages incurred by Plaintiff as costs and expenses in preparation for
exercise of the Option and excluding attorney's fees incurred
by Plaintiff which were provided for under the terms of the
Option agreement.

From the judgment in favor of the Plainti'.:

on the issue of damages the Plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment on damages d
judgment in favor of Plaintiff increasing the award of damage:
as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial on the issue
of damages.
STATEMEllT OF FACTS
The Option
A written Option agreement was entered into between, one
Michael Heyrend, and the Defendant on ~ay 13, 1977 for the P~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

chase of certain real property consisting of 2.63 acres of
unimproved land located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
The Option agreement provided for the payment of the purchase
price for the subject real property if exercised in the cash
sum of $80,000.00 and at the time the Option was obtained,
$1,000.00 was paid as consideration for the Option, which amount
was to be applied to the purchase price if the Option was exercised.

The Option was granted for a three month period and

could be extended for an additional two month period upon payment of an additional $1,000.00 in consideration.

The Option

was subsequently extended two months to and including
October 18, 1977 and an additional $1,000.00 of consideration
was paid to extend the Option.

This additional consideration

also applied to the purchase price so that after applying
the $2,000.00 paid for the Option, the remaining balance was
$78,000.00, (R.5,6; Findings R.103,104).
I1egotiations Prior to the Option
The negotiations between Mr. Heyrend and Defendant for
the Option agreement were conducted by one, David Helm, who
was Hr. Heyrend's agent and who negotiated the relevant real
property agreements on behalf of Mr. Heyrend.

Prior to the date

of execution of the Option agreement, Mr. Helm, on behalf of
Mr. Heyrend, entered into negotiations with the Defendant and
specifically advised the Defendant that Mr. Heyrend was interested in acquiring the Defendant's property in conjunction with
an adjacent parcel of property owned by Mr. and Mrs. DeGooyer
(hereinafter "DeGooyer's property").

Mr. Helm, further advised
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Defendant that the DeGooyer' s property was necessary for acces;
to Defendant's property and it was Mr. Heyrends intention to
develop multiple family residences on the Defendant's propert:i
and the DeGooyer's property combined (Findings R.104).
During the negotiations, Mr. Helm first proposed to the
Defendant that the Defendant enter into a sales agreement with
~.

Heyrend subject to the condition precedent that Mr. Heyrenc ·

be able to enter into a purchase agreement for the DeGooyer's
property and further subject to the condition precedent that
approval from Salt Lake County be obtained for the development
of multiple family residences on the two properties combined.
Defendant requested, however,

that Mr. Heyrend first enter into

an agreement to purchase the DeGooyer's property and then contact Defendant again concerning the purchase of Defendant's
property (Findings R.104).
On May 11, 1977, shortly after the initial negotiations
with Defendant, Mr. Heyrend entered into a written agreement
to purchase the DeGooyer's property for the

S'.lI!l

of $53,000.00,

subject to the express condition precedent that Mr. Heyrend be
able to enter into a purchase agreement for the Defendant's
property

(Findings R.104).

On May 13, 1977, shortly after ~r. Heyrend had entered
into the agreement to purchase the DeGo~yer' s property, Mr· Hel~l
again contacted the Defendant and met with the Defendant and ~
attorney and advised them that Mr. Heyrend had entered into an
agreement to purchase the DeGooyer's property and that it was
conditioned upon Mr. P.eyrends being able to enter into an agr2e·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-5ment

to purchase Defendant's property.

He also discussed the

proposed development on the two properties and said he would
keep Defendant advised on the progress in obtaining Salt Lake
County approval.

The Defendant's attorney thereupon prepared

the Option agreement and Defendant executed it

(Findings R.105;

R.146-148).
During the Option Period
On August 3, 1977, prior to the date the Option had to be
exercised, Mr. Heyrend entered into an agreement to sell the
DeGooyer's property and the Defendant's property and one additional parcel of real property (a parcel adjoining the Defendant's
property which Mr. Heyrend had entered into an agreement to purchase) to Probe Construction Company, a Utah Corporation of which
Plaintiff was the President and sole shareholder

(Findings R.105).

During the Option period, Mr. Heyrend caused to be prepared
a site plan for the proposed development of the two properties with
the necessary access for thirteen duplexes on Defendant's property being provided over the DeGooyer's property.

The site plan

illustrated that the properties were combined and treated as
being under common ownership.

Certain expenses were paid for

the engineering and preparation of the site plan in the amount
of $415.54

(Findings R.105).

During the period of the Option, Mr. Helm contacted
Defendant on many occasions and advised Defendant of the progress
on the approval from Salt Lake County for the planned development.
Approval from Salt Lake County was obtained for the planned
development and Mr. Helm met with Defendant during the Option
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- 6period and so advised her and showed her the site plan illustrating the location of the office building proposed to
be constructed on the DeGooyer's property and the thirteen
duplexes proposed to be constructed on the Defendant's prop~·
(Findings R.105, 106).
On September 28, 1977, prior to the date the Option wit'
Defendant was required to

be exercised, Mr. Heyrend, relying

upon the Option, entered into a new written agreement to purchase the DeGooyer's property which agreement was not subject
to the condition precedent that Mr. Heyrend be able to purcha:
the Defendant's property and Mr. Heyrend paid a cash deposit
as earnest money in the sum of $300.00.

The closing date spec

ified in the new agreement for the DeGooyer's property was
October 27, 1977 which date was after the date Plaintiff gave
notice to Defendant that he was exercising the Option and tha:
he had acquired all of Mr. Heyrends interest in the Option
(Findings R.106).
On October 14, 1977, Mr. Ileyrend agreed with Plaintiff
that Plaintiff's company, Probe Inc. , could assume :1r. Heyrends
rights and interests in the purchase agreement for the DeGoove·
property and in the Option for the Defendant's property to
satisfy Mr. Heyrends obli.gation to sell those parcels of real
property to Plaintiff's company under the written agreer.ient
made on August 3, 1977.

:1r. Heyrend also orally assigned all

of his rights and interests in the contracts to purchase and ~
the same date executed a written assignment of the Ootion for
the purpose of permitting the Plaintiff to exercise the Ootion
directly

(Findings R.106).
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-7In addition to the special expenses paid for engineering
and site plan preparation for the Defendant's property and the
DeGooyer's property combined, the Plaintiff also had an existing
duplex plan and office building plan which had to be revised
to satisfy the requirements of Salt Lake County's approval
for the development.

The Plaintiff paid $400.00 for the mod-

ification of the existing building plans.

The modified plans

were also used by Plaintiff to obtain a commitment for financing
for the proposed development

(R.180,182,183).

Experts' Valuation of Property
Expert testimony was admitted at trial to determine the
fair market value of the Defendant's property upon the date
Defendant breached the Option agreement, October 18, 1977.
Experts for Plaintiff, testified that the value of Defendant's
property was $114,600.00 if the Defendant's property was considered with the benefit of the access to Defendant's property
over the adjoining DeGooyer's property under circumstances where
the two properties were being acquired together, were under common
ownership, or were being used in combination
found-Findings R.107; R.214,215,224,225).

(the Court so

Plaintiff's expert

testified that the value of Defendant's property was $81,339.00,
when ~efendant's property was considered without the benef~t of
the access over the DeGooyer's property

(R.224).

Plaintiff's experts testified that the lower value of
Defendant's property when considered without any combination
with the DeGooyer's property resulted from the

absence of a

sufficient access to the Defendant's property which did not front
upon a public street.

When the DeGooyer's property is acquired
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-

-8together with the Defendant's property, the DeGooyer's property serves as that principal access and therefore the value

of Defendant's property is greatly enhanced by the combinatio:
of the two properties

(R.215,216,225).

Expert testimony for Defendant was that the value of the
Defendant's property on the date of breach was $80, 000. 00 wher.
considering the property without the benefit of any combinatk'
or joint acquisition of the Defendant's property with the
DeGooyer's property

(the Court so found-Findings R.107). De-

fendant's expert also testified that the detriment to Defendar:.
property when considered alone, was that it did not have a
sufficient access to it, and that the highest and best use for
Defendant's property would be in combination with other properties so there would be a principal access and a combination
or joint acquisition of the Defendant's property with the
DeGooyer's property would make the value of the Jefendant's
erty substantially more

~:

(R.235,236).

i

Upon receiving Defendant's experts testimony, the Court
conmiented that the whole issue in the case would be based on

t:
I

question of what was the appropriate measure of damages

(R.23:i

The Court in its Conclusions of Law determined that the appropriate measure of damages was the value of the Defendant's pro:
erty without considering any benefit from the access obtained

1

by combination or joint acquisition with the DeGooyer' s properd
viz, $80,000.00 (the Option price), less the unpaid balance of
I

$78,000.00 for damages in the amount of $2,000.00,

the conside:

ation which was paid to Defendant for the Option and which was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9to be applied to the purchase price if the Option was exercised
(Conclusions-R.107).
The Court further concluded Plaintiff was not entitled
to recover the costs and expenses of engineering and preparation
of a site plan for the proposed development since the loss
of said costs and expenses did not directly result from Defendants breach

(Conclusions-R.107).

The Court also said in its Conclusions of Law that Plaintiff
was entitled to recover, as part of the damages, attorney's
fees under the written terms of the Option agreement, but
evidence of attorney's fees was not presented at trial and
Plaintiff's motion made at the beginning of Plaintiff's closing
argument to permit Plaintiff to offer evidence of attorney's
fees

was denied and therefore, the Court awarded no attorney's

fees

(Conclusions-R.108).
ARGUMENT
Point I

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES MEASURED BY
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE DEFENDAHT'S PROPERTY UPON
THE DATE OF BREACH LESS THE UNPAID BALANCE OF THE CONTRACT PRICE AND WITH THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF DEFENDANT'S
PROPERTY DETERMHIED BY CONSIDERI:~G THE BENEFIT OF THE JOINT
ACQUISITION OR COMBElATION OF THE DEGOOYER' S PROPERTY
AND THE DEFE:IDANT' S PROPERTY.
Under Utah Law, the basic measure of damages for breach
of an agreement to sell real property is the benefit of the
bargain rule from ordinary contract law as stated in Beckstrom
v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Ut. 1978):
"The general rule as to damages in such circumstances is that where a vendor breaches his contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-10to convey property, the vendee is entitled to the
benefit of his bargain; that is, he is entitled to
the market value of the property at the time he would
be entitled to receive conveyance thereof, less the
amount he agreed to pay." 578 P.2d at P.523.
To the same effect are Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771
(Ut. 1977); Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Ut. 1962).
It is important to note that this general rule of damag.
for a vendors breach, i.e., the excess of fair market value
over the balance of the purchase price, was not adopted to
limit the vendee to less than the benefit of his bargain, bu:
instead is expected to be the benefit of the vendee' s bargai:
under usual circumstances.

The Utah Supreme Court has em-

phasized time and time again, that it is

t~e

loss of the

benefit of the bargain to the vendee that the Court is attempting to measure and not mere rigid compliance with a
formula that does not apply in all circumstances.

Indeed

in Beckstrom where Laub, the vendee, had bargained to purchas
80 acres of real property from Vere, who owned O!lly a one-ha:
interest in the property, the Court allowed Laub to retain
forty acres, but reversed on the damages awarded which were
in part based only on Laub's loss of his bargain on one-half
of the property, the forty acres which Vere could not convey
to him.

The Court said;

In view of our decision as set forth herein, that
the Laubs are entitled to the benefit of their bargain
as it would have been if Vere had oerformed on his
contract, it is necessary that there be such a determi~ation
and assessment of damages under the rule above
stated. 578 P.2d 520 at P.523.

It appears that the Supreme Courts intention in Beckstr~
was that Laub should receive damages for the entire benefit
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of his bargain which would be the value of the full 30 acres

-11combined and not merely the loss of the value of the 40
acres he did not receive.

Justice Ellett concurring in the

unanimous opinion in Beckstrom commented as follows:
I concur, but wish to state my opinion as to what
the damages for the Laubs would be on retrial.
I think the Laubs are entitled to the fair market
value of the entire tract of land less the fair market
value of the one-half interest awarded to them;
also, less the $15,000 unpaid on the purchase contract.
578 P.2d 520 at P.524.
In this case the Plaintiff bargained for, and his direct
purpose was, the joint acquisition of both the DeGooyer's
property and the Defendant's property for the enhanced benefit
of their combination by providing the necessary access to
Defendant's property and for the specific purpose of an
integrated development on both properties.

In the initial

negotiations, Defendant was specifically advised of these facts,
and understood these circumstances both before and after the
purchase agreement was entered into for the adjoining DeGooyer's
property

(which was conditioned upon the purchase of Defend-

ant's property).

Only then was the Option agreement entered

into with Defendant who was well informed and advised thereafter of every step taken and the benefit sought to be obtained.
Under these special circumstances for the Court to disregard the benefit of Plaintiff's bargain by merely awarding
Plaintiff damages based on the fair market value of the Defendant's sole property, without the benefit of the joint acquisition and combination known to Defendant prior to entering
into the Option agreement, would be depriving Plaintiff of a
substantial portion of the benefit of his bargain and would
not be consistent with the measure of damages expressed by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12benefit of the bargain rule.
The benefit of the bargain rule which undertakes to put
the vendee in as good as position as he would have been in,
had there been no breach by the vendor is not without limitation.

It is generally held that the vendor should not be

required to pay damages based upon special benefits or circ~
stances known only to the vendee, and which would not be within
the reasonable contemplation of the parties.

However, it is

also well settled that where special circtunstances cause
additional damage to the innocent party, the breaching party
will be held responsible for such damages if he was informed
of such special circtunstances prior to the time the agreemen:
was entered into so that it can be said that the possibility
of such damages were within the contemplation of the parties
at the time of contract.
In Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem·
nity Co.,

325 P.2d 906 (Ut. 1958), the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
The rule as to what damages are recoverable for
breach of contract is based upon the concept of reasonable foreseeability that loss of such general character
would result from the breach.
Therefore, to be comoensable, the loss must result from the breach in the natur
and usual course of events, so that it can fairly and
reasonably be said that if the minds of the parties
had adverted to breach when the contract was made, loss
of such character would have been within their contemplation. 325 P.2d 906 at P.907:
And in 22 Am. Jur. 62 at P.93, the authors state:
Loss of profits growing out of an existing collater:
or subordinate agreement may be recovered where, and onl·
where, the possibility of profits was within the contemplation of the defaulting party when the original contrac
was made and such profits are proved with reasonable
certainty.
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The Utah Supreme Court in a recent case involving
the breach of a real estate option reiterated

the above rules

on measuring damages in distinguishing between general and
special damages, Ranch Hornes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp.
592 P.2d 620 (Ut. 1979).
It is important to point out that the Plaintiff did not
seek damages in the trial court measured by the loss of fair
market value on the two parcels of property being treated as
one, i.e., the DeGooyer's property and the Defendant's property,
but instead sought only to have the damages measured by the
fair market value of the Defendant's property without the
detriment of inadequate access, or alternatively with the
augmented or enhanced value to the Defendant's property by
virtue of the Plaintiff's right to acquire the adjoining
DeGooyer's property and use it to provide the necessary access.
It was this benefit in combining the DeGooyer's property and
the Defendant's property which the Plaintiff sought to have
and which formed the very basis for the negotiations with the
Defendant for the acquisition of Defendant's property and
which benefit was specifically pointed out to the Defendant in
a very direct and above-board manner during the negotiations
prior to entering into the Option agreement.

Therefore, the

measure of damages advocated by Plaintiff falls more squarely
within the general rule of damages than in the category of
special damages although

the result would be the same.

The real estate experts all testified at trial that the
highest and best use of the Defendant's property (indeed per-
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-14haps the only valuable use of Defendant's property), would
be in conjunction with an adjoining property to provide
appropriate access for the use and development of Defendant's
property.

The Utah Supreme Court has said in determining

the fair market value of real property, that the Court should
look to the highest and best use of the land, not the use
being made of the land at the time of breach.

Moyle v. S.L.C

176 P.2d 882 (Ut. 1947); and the Court should take into consideration all factors bearing upon the value of the property
which a reasonable prudent purchaser would consider, includin:
any potential development reasonably to be expected.

State

Road Cormn. v. Woolley, 390 P.2d 860 (Ut. 1964); State Road
Cormn. v. Wood, 452 P.2d 872 (Ut. 1969). 1
There can be little doubt that the Defendant's property
had a higher value when purchased with the DeGooyer's propert;
to provide for the necessary access to the Defendant's property.

The Defendant knew that the highest and best use of

Defendant's property was in conjunction with the DeGooyer's
property since Defendant attempted to purchase the DeGooyer's
property by making a written offer to the 8eGooyers shortly
after the date the Defendant breached the Option agreement
(R.207,203).

Therefore,

in determining the value of Defendan:

property for purposes of measuring the loss of Plaintiff's
bargain,

the value should be viewed from Plaintiff's position

lAlthough most cases discussing how to value land are
condemnation cases, the principles develooed in condemnation cases are applicable in determining the value in
breach of contract actions.
Reed v. Wadsworth,
553 P. 2d 1024 (Uy. 1976).
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-15in having existing contract rights to acquire the DeGooyer's
property.

This principal is set forth at 27 Am. Jur. 2d

§

280:

The fact that the most profitable use can be made
only in ~onnection with other lands does not necessarily
exclude it from cnsideration, if the possibility of
such connection is reasonably sufficient to affect
market value. 27 Am. Jur. 2d § 230 at P.72.
This principal was applied in United States v. Jaramillo,
190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951), a condemnation case, where the
Defendant landowner in addition to owning the condemned
land also held a grazing permit on adjacent Federal land.

The

Court held it was proper to take the value of the grazing
permit into account in determining the market value of the
condemned land under its highest and best use, i.e., a ranch.
Also in United Statesv. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 35 L.Ed. 2d 16,
93 S.Ct. 801 (1973), the Supreme Court stated:
This court has held that generally the highest and
best use of a parcel may be found to be a use in conjunction with other parcels, and that any increment
of value resulting from such combination may be taken
into consideration in valuing the interest.
To the same effect, see State Highway Comm. v. Bloom,
94 N.W. 2d 572 (1958); Tucson Title Ins. Co. v. State Ex Rel
Herman, 489 P.2d 299 (Ariz. 1971).
In this case at the very outset of negotiations with
Defendant for the purchase of Defendant's property the Defendant was specifically advised that the intended use to be made
of Defendant's property was for multiple family dwellings and
that the only way that use and benefit could be realized was
by purchasing the adjoining DeGooyer's property along with
Defendant's property so access could be provided.

The highest
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-16and best use of Defendant's property was in this combination
Defendant was first approached about entering into a purchase agreement subject to the condition precedent that the
purchase of the DeGooyer' s property be obtained.

In fact, it

was Defendant that recorrnnended that the purchase agreement fo·
the DeGooyer's property be entered into first before Defendu:
enter into an agreement to sell her property.

Then

after the purchase agreement for the DeGooyer's property had
been entered into, Defendant was specifically advised that
that agreement

had been made and that is was conditioned

upon Defendant's agreement to sell her property so that the
contemplated multiple family development could be realized.
Even after Defendant entered into the Option agreement, Defen:
ant was continually advised about the progress of the approva.
from Salt Lake County for the proposed development on the two
properties combined and was shown a site plan illustrating fr
proposed development on the properties.
It would be difficult to imagine how Defendant could

h~

been better informed as to what the potential loss and damage
to Plaintiff would be if Defendant breached the Option agreement.

Indeed, it was only after Plaintiff realized that he

could not continue to tie up the DeGooyer's property any
longer after

Defendants breach,

tha: Plaintiff amended his

complaint to claim only for damages for his loss and not alter
atively for specific performance by Defendant.
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-17Point II
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER SPECIAL DAMAGES FOR
THE COSTS &'ID EXPENSES INCURRED IN RELIAtlCE UPON THE
OPTION AGREEl1L·1T.
During the five month Option period, Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's assignor, Mr. Heyrend, paid and incurred certain
expenses in reasonable reliance upon the Option agreement and
in preparation for obtaining approval from Salt Lake County
for the proposed development on Defendant's property.
The Court, in its Findings of Fact, found that certain
expenses were paid in the amount of $415.54 for the engineering
and preparation of a site plan illustrating the location
of the proposed development on the properties.

The Plaintiff

also paid the sum of $400.00 for drafting services to modify
an existing office building plan and duplex plan to meet the
requirements of Salt Lake County in its approval of the proposed development and for Plaintiff's use in obtaining financing.

The Court also found that a cash earnest money deposit

in the sum of $300.00 was paid to the DeGooyers under the
terms of the purchase agreement entered into on September 28,
1977, and such sum was forfeited to the DeGooyers after Defendant breached the Option agreement and the Plaintiff could not
complete the purchase transaction.
Despite the fact that the total amount of these special
costs and expenses was only $1,115.54, and that they were out
of pocket costs rendered useless directly by Defendants breach;
nevertheless, the Court concluded that Plaintiff could not
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-13recover these costs and expenses as special damages since
the loss did not directly result from Defendant's breach
(see Conclusions of Law, R.107).
The Utah Supreme Court in Ranch Hornes, Inc. v. Greater
Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620 (Ut. 1979), a recent decision
involving the breach of an Option agreement and an action
for damages by the optionee-developer, stated the rule for
special damages:
The term "general damages", as applied to the
instant case, denotes those damages which in the usual
course of things flow from the breach. They are of
course limited to those resulting from the ordinary
and obvious purpose of the contract, which in the case
at hand would be the "loss of bargain" represented
by the difference between the market value of the land
and the option price.
On the other hand, the term
"special damages" denotes those damages which arise
from the special circumstances of the case.
They have
been said to be such damages as, by competent evidence,
are directly traceable to failure to discharge a contractual obligation.
This Court has on numerous occasions noted the
distinction between general and special damages and the
applicability of each as a proper measure of damages.
We again reiterate that, in addition to general damages.
one is entitled to recover those special damages
which arise from circumstances eculiar to a articular
case, rovided the ma be reasonab
su oosed to have
been within the contem ation or the arties when the
contract was ma e, an provide
urther, that they are
properly pleaded and proved.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the
o tion a reement which is the sub"ect of this case, it
is obvious
the ver nature o such an a reernent that
it was we 1 wit in the contern
the contractin
arties that certain re evant ex en itures ma be necessary an require on t e part ot the optionee in.or er
to determine the feasibility of exercising the option.
592 P.2d 620 at P.624. (emphasis added).
The Court in Ranch Homes,

Inc. held specifically that

such special damages consisting of out of pocket expenditures
in reliance on the Option agreement are recoverable by Plain-
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tiff provided that such expenditures are found to have been
reasonably made.

The Court in striking down a portion of

the damages awarded as being unreasonable expenditures drew
a contrast between such excessive amounts and" ... reasonable
costs of preparing a preliminary plat necessary to secure
favorable zoning and financing and to estimate development
costs." Id at P.625.
In this case costs and expenses in the amount of $815.54
were incurred directly in preparation of a preliminary site
plan and modified building plan necessary for zoning approval
and for financing, and although a modest sum, it was effective
to secure favorable approval from Salt Lake County and approval
of Plaintiff's financing.
The earnest money deposit of $300.00 forfeited on the
DeGooyer's purchase was directly lost as a result of Defendants breach and the Defendant knew prior to entering into the
Option

agreement that the parties contemplated making efforts

to obtain approval from Salt Lake County for the proposed
multiple family development on Defendant's property and that
the DeGooyer's property was only of value for the proposed
development with the Defendant's property.

Even prior to the

date of exercising the Option and Defendants breach, the
Defendant had been shown the site plan illustrating the proposed development on her property combined with the DeGooyer's
property and had been continually advised of the progress in
obtaining approval from Salt Lake County for the development.
The trial judges exclusion of these out of pocket costs
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-20from the damage award was not based upon an error in the
Findings of Fact with respect to the amounts expended, but
was instead based upon an erroneous Conclusion of Law that
Plaintiff was not entitled to these special damages as not
directly resulting from Defendants breach.

This conclusion

is certainly not consistent with the Utah Supreme Courts pro.
nouncer:ient in Ranch Homes, Inc.
Point III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO PUT ON EVIDENCE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The written Option agreement executed by Defendant provided that in the event of Defendants breach, that the Defendant would be required to pay reasonable attorney's fees.

\Jhe:

a written contract or instrument has provision for reasonable
attorney's fees then an award of such fees becomes an element
of damages and the Court is required to award fees, although
the amount of such award will rest within the discretion of
the trial court,
In this case,

see Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771 (Ut. 1977).
the Court concluded that Plaintiff was

entitled to recover attorney's fees under the Option agreement
however, evidence of attorney's fees was not presented at
trial and Plaintiff's motion made at the beginning of Plaintiff's closing argument,

to be pennitted to offer evidence of

attorney's fees, was denied

(see Conclusions of Law R.108).

The Court was cognizant of the fact that the Plaintiff was entitled to be awarded attorney's fees, but the Court would not
indulge Plaintiff's counsel's mistake in resting his case
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-21(illllllediately followed by Defendant's resting) and then
rememberingat the outset of his closing argument, that he
had forgotten his last witness, namely himself, to provide
evidence of attorney's fees.

It was only 4:00 o'clock

in the afternoon and the Court reporter,

parties, and

respective counsel were all present in Court when Plaintiff's
counsel requested that the Court allow him to reopen his
case for just a few minutes to put on evidence of attorney's
fees.

He advised the Court that he had an affidavit of

attorney's fees itemizing the services that were performed
and asked if the Court would permit him to offer it and to
testify only on the total time and value so that Plaintiff
could be awarded fees, but the Court denied this motion.
It is difficult to understand how the Defendant's case
could have been prejudiced by allowing the Plaintiff to put
on evidence of attorney's fees

since there was more than

ample time remaining before the end of the day for counsel for
both sides to conclude their closing arguments.
It would seem understandable that after examining many
witnesses and in the midst of the pressure of trial that
Plaintiff's counsel, not being assisted, could make a technical
mistake.

However, for the Court to refuse to permit him to

put on such evidence where no prejudice could result to the
Defendant, other than to escape from paying any award of
attorney's fees, appears inconsistent with the intent of the
modern Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The manifest intent was

to liberalize procedure to accomplish a more just and equit-
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-22able result and to avoid the technicalities and nice formalities that were sometimes an impediment in the past.

A particular example of this is Rule

61.

"Harmless

Error" which in substance requires that no errors or other
technical defects or irregularities should disturb a judgment or order or serve as grounds for a new trial unless
refusal to take such action appears to the Court inconsisten:
with substantial justice.

Rule 61. ends by saying,

The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
It would seem that this last sentence means that an attorney
should have no reason to complain about an error or defect
that does not prejudice the substantial rights of the

part~1

It should be equally true that the Court should disregard
the technical procedural defect by Plaintiff's counsel in
resting his case before remembering that he had failed to
put on evidence of attorney's fees, which did not prejudice
Defendant, but did affect the substantial rights of the
Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis,

it is respectfully

submitted that Plaintiff is entitled to damages measured
by the fair market value of Defendant's property considered
with the enhancement in value attributable to Plaintiffs
right to purchase the adjoining DeGooyer's property and provide necessary access to the Defendant's property.
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The

-23value of 8efendant's property when considered with the
benefit of an access was $114,600.00 and after deducting
the unpaid balance on the Option price in the amount of
$73,000.00, Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount
of $36,600.00.
Plaintiff is also entitled to special damages in the
amount of $1,115.54 representing the out of pocket costs
and expenses paid for preliminary engineering and plans
and the deposit lost upon the DeGooyer purchase transaction
all of which costs and expenses were rendered valueless to
Plaintiff by Defendants breach.
Plaintiff is further entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney's fees in an amount to be determined by the trial
court in accordance with the terms of the Option agreement.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of February, 1980.

BURBIDGE, MABEY & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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